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Abstract 
The word terrorism is one of the most-used terms in a daily life of people in this century. 
Governments and organisations apply many different definitions to cope with their existing 
issue(s). Thus, the terrorism risk evaluation is one of the most important matters in today’s life. 
Many contributors involve in this process worldwide, and each organization or government has 
its preferences and definition. In Norway, several parties involve in the risk assessment 
investigation, i.e.  (Egeli, 2014). Thus, using a standard procedure for the risk evaluation in this 
area is of interest. For this reason, the two Standard are considered (NS 5831, 2014, NS 5832, 
2014).  
The issue is to compare the existing scholarly literature within the area of security risk 
assessment with the standard procedure for security risk assessment in Norway to find the 
possible weakness points. The thesis discussed the most significant weakness points of the 
Standard and concluded that the four top points need reviewing and changing. The weakness 
points are risk definition, risk picture, strategies to deal with the risk, and applying the reducing 
measures.  
At the end, the risk analysis may end up with the various alternative of different types 
each has its value and, therefore, the analysis compares them to each other to find the most 
suitable result. Standard suggests to find the threat from different contributors include technical, 
organizational, and human resources. The various contributors have different values, for 
example, the value of statistical life, damage to the infrastructure, and damage to the 
environment have not the same values and comparing them is a controversial task. According 
to Abrahamsen et al. (2011) the only way is to transform all attributes into the one comparable 
value. They stress that these frameworks are tools to help the decision-maker having the most 
useful and reliable decision and hence, the tools should take carefully to avoid the mechanical 
and decision-making process. Furthermore, the ALARP and the cautionary principle applies 
for both safety and security sector in the risk assessment to balance the situation safely and 
financially. The thesis focuses on the security standard in Norway, and suggest other Standards 
and Regulations for further work in this area.  
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Abbreviations 
ALARP As Low As Reasonably Practicable 
BAT Best Available Technology 
BRTF Better Regulation Task Force  
CBA Cost-benefit Analysis  
E[NPV] Expected Net Present Value 
ETA Event Tree Analysis  
FAR Fatal Accident Rate  
FIZ Fuzziness, Incompleteness and Randomness 
FTA Fault Tree Analysis  
ICAF Implied Cost of Averting a Statistical Fatality 
IR Individual Risk  
MC Monte Carlo Simulation 
ME Method of Moments  
ML Method of Maximum Likelihood  
MTO Man, Technology, and Organization 
NPV Net Present Value 
PDF Probability Density Function  
PLL Potential Loss of Life  
PMF Probability Mass Function  
PRA Probabilistic Risk Assessment 
PST Politiets sikkerhetstjeneste 
TOR Tolerability of Risk  
VSL Value of Statistical Life  
 
The word Standard in this document refers to Norwegian standards for risk management 
and risk analysis (NS 5831, 2014, NS 5832, 2014), respectively. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
There exist several parties that involve in the risk assessment investigation in Norway, 
e.g. (Egeli, 2014). They are the most contributor in risk evaluation and each of which may have 
its procedure. It is of the great interest to know whether they use the precise definition of risk 
and its critical elements. Hence, the existing standard procedure shall be assessed to ensure that 
they are fruitful for the defined purposes and serve the society’s interest. The Standard is the 
reference for any investigation within the prescribed area and, therefore, it is crucial to reflect 
the meaningful assessment procedure.  
Furthermore, presenting risk picture may lead to different uncertain variables like in the 
terrorist risk assessment or the MTO (Man, Technology, and Organization) method for offshore 
safety assessment. Indeed, the impact of the terrorist attack is different for the society, economy 
and politic and, therefore, the result may show outcomes of various types. There exist different 
views on decision-making when facing the uncertainty that are mostly about applying the risk 
reducing measures in connection with an economy that is of interest. 
1.2 Challenges 
The challenge is to define the risk and to present the risk picture in a way that covers all 
areas of the risk. The key aspect of risk assessment when facing to complicated situations is 
uncertainty, so, the risk picture should highlight this aspect. Different approaches to risk 
highlight various aspects, therefore, finding the appropriate approach to risk assessment is of 
interest. The widely used approach is the probability-based risk assessment (PRA), and many 
works have been done worldwide within this area in the industries, ref (Bedford and Cooke, 
2001; Vinnem, 2014). Aven et al. criticised this approach to risk analysis and mentioned that 
the PRA can not highlight uncertainty (Aven et al., 2014). Hence, for assessing the risk in the 
social security section or the offshore industries, the analyst faces to uncertain elements and 
enormous consequences. It is suggested to use the uncertainty-based risk assessment that 
involves modelling, knowledge evaluation and surprise assessment.  
For the purpose of security risk assessment in Norway, two Standards reviewed which 
are (NS 5831, 2014, NS 5832, 2014). They apply to risk management and risk analysis 
respectively. The definitions and procedure for the assessment shall be reappraised to find any 
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possible vagueness in the definitions and the procedure. There are many examples that are not 
clear and do not give any message for further steps in these Standards. One example is about 
risk description according to (NS 5832, 2014). The Standard defines pure risk as the potential 
for loss and not the potential of profit. Another example is choosing strategies in proportion to 
the risk that may have wide implication in the society. One alternative strategy is to transfer 
risk to other. With these two examples, the author convinced that it is necessary to review the 
Standards in depth to find whether it is appropriate for the terrorist risk assessment. There are 
some weakness points either in the used approach or in the risk definitions that considered in 
this thesis. 
The second part is also close to this area. It is about presenting a risk in a practical way 
to decision-makers that is useful to finalise the situation with the most suitable decision. Some 
economists may prefer traditional cost-benefit analysis to transfer all aspects to money while 
others challenge this model and prefer the multi-attribute analysis to avoid transferring            
non-market issues into money. Abrahamsen et al. argued that all uncertain variables of different 
types shall transfer to the unique value having consistent and transparent decision-
making(Abrahamsen et al., 2011). Presenting the existing discussion in this area is of interest. 
1.3 Scope and Limitation 
The thesis reviews the Norwegian standard for the security risk assessment to answer 
the question; to how extent the Standard for the security risk analysis is fruitful? Moreover, the 
author presents the existing literature on decision-making and combine them to have a useful 
overview. 
In some sources, threat mentioned as terrorist and sabotage for the security risk 
assessment,  e.g.,(Guikema and Aven, 2010). In this thesis, we consider threat as the terrorist 
attack and do not mention sabotage because many of them are not group work for political 
reasons. In general, the sabotage is not as clever as a terrorist attack with an adaptable plan.  
1.4 Content 
The first part ofter the introduction contains review scholarly articles and books. In this 
part, security risk assessment presents alongside with two approaches to risk assessment to 
show the applicable area for each approach. Although the PRA has a wide application the 
weakness points of this process presented in the literature. The presentation clarifies to how 
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extent the uncertainty assessment is necessary. Furthermore, several tools are presented for the 
process of decision-making. 
The third part reviews the Norwegian standard for security risk assessment. The 
Standard contains the requirement for evaluating the security risk. Hence, Standard shall 
contains clear definitions and straightforward procedure. Thus, §3 presents the Norwegian 
standard for security risk assessment, and §4 is the discussion about the Standard and decision-
making. Conclusion and further work present in (§5). 
On How to Describe Security Risk? 
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2 Theory 
2.1 Different Approaches to Risk Assessment 
Reminding §2.2.3 in Willis approach the probability, and the expected values are 
considered to calculate the risk. This approach calls probability-based assessment (PRA), which 
has some weakness points. In this section, two different approaches to risk and the associated 
risk picture present according to the literature. 
Risk analysis comprises of three main steps; planning, risk assessment, and risk 
treatment. Planning step aims to identify the problem, organising works and obtaining 
information. This step defines the possible measures and the acceptable level of risk. In the 
second step, analysts should determine the causes/threats, consequences, and the probability of 
occurrence. The last step is risk treatment that carries out to assess the measures, comparing all 
available alternatives, managerial review and decision making at the end. For short, The risk 
assessment involves identifying threats, analysing causes and consequences also defining the 
risk picture at the end (Aven, 2008).  Defining the risk picture is the key point of different 
perspectives of risk that highlights various aspects of risk.  
2.1.1 Probability-Based Risk Assessment (PRA) 
Many different descriptions of risk are available from the traditional perception of the 
risk to the new perspective that applies for scientific reasons see, e.g.(Veland and Aven, 2013). 
Mostly, the risk introduced as probability and the expected value. In this sense, The risk defined 
as a triplet ( )iii xps ,, , ref (Kaplan and Garrick,1981 mentioned by Bedford and Cooke, 2001). 
In this risk picture, "s" is the scenario, "p" is the probability of occurrence, and "x" is the 
associated consequences. Thus, probability plays a significant role in this risk picture, and 
analysts pay the considerable attention to the probability calculation using any appropriate 
model(s). The risk have been described more widely as ( )PCA ,, in which A is an undesirable 
event, C is the consequences, and P is the probability describes in either relative frequency or 
subjective probability. In this approach, the analyst assigns the probability number for each 
unfavourable events (Aven, 2011). This risk picture defines the risk as the undesirable event, 
associated consequences and the likelihood of occurrence of both events and consequences. 
The PRA relies on the probability and the expected values for undesirable outcomes. 
The approach aims to define the expected value of all possible causes and consequences in the 
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assessment.  The PRA consist of six steps that present shortly in the following, ref (Aven et al., 
2014). 
- Identification of threat/hazard: it is the first step, consist of understanding the system 
application to find the proper condition of the system. There is a different contribution 
to safety and security assessment that introduced in (§2.2.2). 
- Cause Analysis: this step is to identify the condition of changing from the standard 
situation to hazard/treat. 
- Consequences Analysis: the possible effects of each threat/ hazard identify in this step. 
For each scenario of an accident/attack, the fault tree implement to identify the avoiding 
barriers and the paths leading to the initiating event. On the other side of the bow-tie 
diagram, the event tree is used to identify the mitigating obstacles and possible 
consequences, see Figure 2.1. 
- Probabilistic Analysis: analysts determine the probability of occurrence for each 
scenario. In this step, analysts can find scenarios with significant consequences and high 
probability of occurrence. However, the modern approach shall consider the scenarios 
with low probability and enormous consequences. 
- Risk Description: Based on cause and consequences analysis, analysts illustrate risk 
picture and risk matrix for each scenario. Risk matrix helps to identify the major 
scenarios. Some indicators use to describe the risk such as potential loss of life (PLL), 
fatal accident rate (FAR), and individual risk (IR).  
- Risk Evaluation: in the last step predetermined criteria compares to the result of risk 
analysis and if necessary measures apply to reduce the risk to the tolerable level. 
However, in the security risk analysis there is no clear sign of developing a problem. 
Hence, the analysis needs more reliable data from different sources together with expert 
judgement. It seems clever to use the word undesirable event instead of an initiating event in 
the security risk assessment because the associated consequences might be enormous and 
irrecoverable.  
The most used probability interpretation in PRA is the frequentist probability. 
Frequentist probability of an event A defines as the fraction of time event A occurs if the 
experiment repeats (hypothetically), in a long run. If the considered test or operation occurs n 
times, and event A occur nA times then, frequentist probability is defined as the limit of the ratio 
between nA and n when n goes to infinity. This probability is considered to be converged on a 
On How to Describe Security Risk? 
6 
 
number in the long run under a particular condition, ref (Aven and Reniers, 2013). Hence, this 
probability defines as; 
( )
∞→






=
n
A
f
n
nAP lim
 
Running the test or operation, for many times, result in some actual probability that 
describes the aleatory uncertainty in a quantitative way. However, the analysts cannot repeat 
the test for infinite times because the physical characteristics of the components degrade. 
Therefore, the circumstance does not meet the “similar condition” in reality. Thus, it is just a 
model to describe the real phenomena where the considered population is always finite. 
Assuming that the probability exists, and it is the same in all independent experiments, the 
frequentist probability can be applied. Nevertheless, it is utterly impossible to make a defect in 
the particular machine for many times, without changing characteristics of it as assumed but 
for practical reasons it is possible to adapt the frequentist probability. For more information on 
justification, see (Aven et al., 2014, p. 32). 
In oil and gas industries the situation, for example, a defect in the system components, 
might be different from time to time. In this manner, analysts make a frequentist probability 
model for system components and hence, according to their reliability block diagram the 
likelihood of initial event calculates e.g. leakage1. Reminding §2.2.2, the probability of a 
terrorist attack or other issues within the security sector is subjective.In subjective probability, 
experts assign the probability of an attack based on the background knowledge and their 
judgement, more discussion at §2.1.2. 
2.1.1.1 Probabilistic Models and Application to the Risk Analysis 
Many statisticians apply the probability models to calculate the uncertainty involving in 
the experiments. The problem of implementing such models arise when considering the 
epistemic uncertainty. For example, the models like Markov chain has application in physics 
and mathematics because, mostly, the experiments in this area involve aleatory uncertainty 
regarding the observation. Indeed, a physical experiment involves a chain of successive events 
which applies to the availability and maintenance.  
                                                 
1
 The probability of defect in many critical components in industries especially for oil and gas is collected in the 
handbook so called "Offshore Reliability Data Handbook"(OREDA, 2002). 
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For the purpose of probabilistic modelling, analysts use known distributions with the 
expected values for parameters, ref (Bedford and Cooke, 2001). In this approach, the likelihood 
of each undesirable event models mathematically and, therefore, the distributions play the key 
role in the assessment. The probabilistic modelling and its calculation has a link to data and 
expert’s consideration. However, some experts argued that focusing on the probability numbers 
and distribution camouflage the uncertainty regarding causes and consequences,                        
ref (Abrahamsen et al., 2010). Some probabilistic models present in this section due to their 
application in the risk modelling together with their pros and cons to the risk assessment.  
2.1.1.1.1 Markov Chain 
Researchers have adapted Markov chain theory to solve numerous scientific problems 
like Paul Ehrenfest to solve some thermodynamic issues(Ghahramani, 2005). Thus, applying 
this method to solve another stochastic process might be possible. Markov analysis is the 
method of quantification. Nevertheless, the transition is an evolution in the system or 
degradation of a system components, as long as the change meet the circumstances Markov 
chain applies to solve the probability transition. According to Aven et al., the FTA can be used 
to calculate the transition parameters of Markov chain (Aven et al., 2007).  
Markov analysis is a useful model in the context of availability and maintenance 
analysis. However, it is not easy to formulate realistic problems such as in offshore disaster or 
the terrorist attack. It is not well-suited to predict all possible failures and unforeseen. 
Additionally, it is not always easy to calculate the steady-state probability of the future events. 
On the other hand, the result from the model is just one probability number that does not contain 
useful information in practice. Furthermore, Markov analysis focuses on the rate of happening. 
Thus, it jumps from the start point to the probability numbers. The model focuses on the 
probability numbers and therefore uncertainty regarding causes and consequences are 
missed(Abrahamsen et al., 2010). 
The second weakness point of the Markov analysis arises when considering the 
exponential distribution for continuous Markov chain. Although it takes into account the 
chronological order of events for continuous Markov chain the time between transitions is 
exponentially distributed while not all process in industries follows the exponential 
distributions. In the terrorist risk assessment, the steps does not depend on any known 
distributions and the continuously chains has no application to our purposes. The third point is 
absorbing state that does not present the status of the system and just shows the outcome of the 
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function. Also, the absorbing state does not depend on the type of failure or failure time. In         
a word, this state does not help to understand the system. The last but not the least point about 
the Markov process is the order of the steps. In the security risk assessment, the three factors 
play the same role according to Willis. It means threat, vulnerability, and consequences should 
cover the critical area and, therefore, they do not come one after another like in the Markov 
process. The Markov process is a stochastic process and like many other models focuses on the 
aleatory uncertainties. Markov chain can not reveal the epistemic uncertainty, i.e. (Ghahramani, 
2005; Levin et al., 2009).  
2.1.1.1.2 Monte Carlo Simulation 
Monte Carlo simulation is a mathematical model to simulate the probability rate of the 
undesirable events. The simulator applies to consider the effect of uncertainty in risk 
assessment. This technique is well-defined in some part of science such as portfolio analysis, 
corporate finance, and reliability analysis. Additionally, the procedure applies as a numerical 
tool to solve the mathematical issues. For example, the simulation applies to calculate the 
integral in the Bayesian formula. 
In the probabilistic risk assessment, (PRA) historical data and expert judgement are two 
fundamental key points to predict the future. The data and expert consideration lead to                     
a stochastic model such as in Bayesian updating and Monte Carlo Simulation. Indeed, analysts 
estimate the future using some models, and the estimation is, of course, involve uncertainty. 
For example, in construction industries engineers try to estimate the time and cost of the project 
with previous data and experts opinion. 
The result of the assessment is, therefore, a probability number and there is no further 
information about the event(s).  The calculation can be a little bit accurate if we use the range 
of maximum and minimum value beside the average one. Shortly, Monte Carlo simulation 
(MC) allows to mix different distribution for differents elements of the analysis. The model can 
choose the data randomly from each defined parameter and calculates the outcome. Moreover, 
the simulator can repeat the process of choosing randomly and calculate the likelihood for many 
times. This section is conducted according to Raychaudhuri (2008)and Earl and Deem (2008).  
Unlike the Markov process, the MC Simulation does not apply the sequence of events 
in a chain. The MC simulation takes all involved parameters into consideration, simultaneously. 
The model is based on the repeated random experiments when the result of statistical data is 
unknown. Another advantage of the model is to use the numerical rules instead of mathematical 
solution for the equations. However, choosing the appropriate scenario for the experiment is 
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not an easy task. Experts evaluate the scenarios and then rate them from the best scenario to the 
worst one. Another difficulty is to consider several scenarios in the simulation and the only way 
is to use a computer software such as; Oracle Crystal Ball and @RISK from Palisade. 
Defining the parameters is the first step of applying MC simulation. In this stage, all 
necessary parameters define to use in the MC model. It seems this step is more judgemental 
according to the expert’s opinion and similar previous conditions. 
Assigning the appropriate distribution of each parameter is the next step. A distribution 
describes each parameter either discrete or a continuous one. For example, binomial and 
Poisson distribution are discrete, and normal, exponential, and Weibull are continuous 
distribution. The analysts try to fit existing historical data into a known distribution. This 
process is called fitting. Fitting means using numerical methods to fit the data into a probability 
distribution that is suitable. In fact, fitting is the calculation of the distribution parameter. Three 
methods mentioned in the literature for data fitting such as; Method of Maximum Likelihood 
(ML), Method of Moments (ME), and Nonlinear Optimization. According to Raychaudhuri 
(2008), Maximum Likelihood Estimation has the better answer than ME method however it is 
sometimes difficult to apply this model even with the computer.  
The third step is to choose a variable for each parameter as random. The MC method 
helps to generate the sequence of numbers as random. Thus, the probability defines using all 
selected variable in the trails. Of course, choosing a number in each trail is uncertain but the 
complex process involves possible outcomes that may neglect in the model.  
The trail repeats many times to calculate the probability. The most common method for 
generating random variable is (RV`s). For generating random variables from distribution, we 
can apply inverse transformation method. This method works with the inverse of probability 
density function (PDF) or the inverse of probability mass function (PMF).  
Monte Carlo simulation considers all involving parameters of real system likewise time 
dependency and failure behaviour. Moreover, this method avoids error-prone tasks like a vast 
numbers of spreadsheets in FTA (Fault Tree Analysis) and ETA (Event Tree Analysis). 
However, the simulation time is almost high, for example; 100,000 trailers is done within 8 
hours for a stratospheric balloon risk assessment(Aven et al., 2007). Mostly, the MC method 
considers the aleatory uncertainty associated with the data collection and mathematical model. 
However, the method neglects the epistemic uncertainty about the process. 
In line with MC simulation and mainly for probability-based risk assessment finding the 
appropriate distribution is of the primary interest. Thus, analysts try to build the distribution, 
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according to the available data. The data mentioned above which is used to make a model can 
be either historical or a new observation. In this manner, different techniques presented to make 
the proper distribution, according to available data in the literature.  For this reason, Method of 
Maximum Likelihood(ML), and the Method of Moments(ME) can be applied, e.g.,(Haimes, 
2005; Raychaudhuri, 2008).  
Haimes (2005) believes that the worst-case scenarios occur in the tails of the 
distributions. This author emphasised that analysts pay the considerable attention to the mean 
value of the distribution and keep less attention to the tails of the considered distribution. The 
tails of a distribution show the unforeseen with a lower probability of occurrence and severe 
consequences. Additionally, Aven (2010) stated that the variance make the difference between 
the mean value and the tails of the distribution.  
Furthermore, focusing on the average value may lead to choosing the different 
distribution with different tails. For example, Normal and Uniform distributions have the same 
mean value while their tails are different and extreme events occur in this part of the assigned 
distribution. Shortly, choosing the appropriate distribution and careful attention to design the 
tails is the challenging part of the PRA (Haimes, 2005). 
Monte Carlo simulation has the vast application in economic risk evaluation by 
considering the effect of various parameters. The model let the analysis to repeat the calculation 
for many times and consider different variables simultaneously. However, for the security risk 
reasons the variables are complex to define a distribution and future events are more ambiguous 
to predict with this simulation. In short it might be possible to combine the existing data from 
different sources with this model for very limited decisions but assessing the risk of terrorist 
attack is not the scope of this simulation. 
2.1.1.1.3 Bayesian Inference 
The formula came to open by Thomas Bayes in 1763 for the first time. The method is 
now one of the strongest approaches in the statistical inference. Professor Dennis V. Lindley, 
the most advocate of Bayesian updating, stated that the Bayesian inference has as equal rank as 
the equation of Einstein and fundamental rules of genetic (Lindley, 2013). It tells us how to 
update the likelihood of events with newly acquired information. Lindley relied on the inference 
as a complete tool to update uncertainty. In his view, any further parameter and function to 
value uncertainty is related to our understanding but is not necessary. The argument of Lindley 
is correct as long as the distribution and applied models reveal all aspects of risk.  However, the 
unforeseen is a rare event with a very low probability of occurrence, e.g., (Taleb, 2010). The 
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unforeseen may not expose in the central area of the distribution, i.e. (Haimes, 2005). The 
posterior distribution for the sample of “n” observation is; 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) θθθ
θθθ
dfxxxf
fxxxf
xxxf
n
n
n
∫
= |,...,,
|,...,,
,...,,|
21
21
21  
The prior distribution of the marginal density of parameter θ is ( ) ( )dxxff ∫= θθ , . 
Since the denominator in is at most one, the posterior distribution is almost equal to the 
multiplication of prior and the likelihood function. 
( ) ( ) ( )θθθ fxxxfxxxf nn |,...,,,...,,| 2121 ∝  
According to Bedford and Cooke (2001)there is a shortage of disagreement among 
experts either in the way of carrying out the inference or principles to judge the quality of 
estimation techniques. Experts believe that using MLE instead of Bayesian updating is an easier 
way to update the uncertainty about the parameter. The foundation of this argument is a 
dependency of Bayesian inference to the prior distribution. Note that the maximum likelihood 
estimator (MLE) derives from the maximum likelihood principle.  
( ) ( )∏
=
=
n
i
ixfxL
1
|| φφ
 
Recall however in case of extensive observation, the role of prior distribution gets 
weaker, and the posterior distribution tends to converge to mass distribution at the real value of 
the parameter. In a word, the posterior depends on the new data. In the same manner, MLE 
tends to converge to the actual value of the parameter and, therefore, the two estimators has a 
similar answer. Hence, in the light of the big amount of new observation it is better to use the 
simpler inference that is off course MLE. Note that in MLE approach, it is not necessary to 
make a prior distribution. 
The major difference between Bayesian and MLE is to choose a particular prior to 
Bayesian updating. The prior distribution for Bayesian paradigm is subjective, and every 
individual has a unique choice of this issue. As long as the prior is not objective the analysts try 
to find it with consensus. Nevertheless which model applies to make the prior distribution, two 
popular way of doing this task is to use expert judgement and generic data. 
Concerning the Bayesian updating, if the distribution has one parameter φ, Bayesian 
updating writes as ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )xppxpxP /|| φφφ = . However, some distributions have two 
parameters and, therefore, for the parameter of interest φ and a nuisance parameter ψ the 
inference writes as ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )xppxpxP /,,||, ψφψφψφ = . In line with the formula, Professor 
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Lindley mentioned two difficulties in applying the model. The first barrier is summation over 
the parameters when calculating prior distribution and eliminating a nuisance that analysts use 
numerical methods to solve the integration. The second challenge arises when constructing the 
prior distribution.  
Besides two difficulties in applying the model, the inference has attracted three serious 
criticisms. First, the prior distribution ( )φp in unknown. Second, the posterior distribution is 
subjective probability while the experiments and phenomena are objective(Lindley, 2013). 
Another criticism levelled at the model is that the model is unable to reveal the Black Swan, ref  
(Aven, 2013a according to Taleb, 2010).  
Lindley praised the Bayesian inference, and he answered the censure in his book. 
Although parameter φ is unknown, the analyst has some information about the parameter before 
doing the experiment. Fundamentally, scientists make a new test collecting new data say, x, 
according to their understanding about φ. The critics stated that it is challenging to assign a 
proper distribution for prior φ and Lindley suggested doing further research into a method of 
assessment that lead to a better estimation of distribution and parameter(s). Furthermore, he 
agreed on this point that science is objective, and the probability is, of course, subjective. The 
author argued that two persons with different prior knowledge about an experiment led to an 
agreement in case of sharing a new observation. In a word, as long as the amount of acquisition 
is enough to dominate in the model then the Bayesian rule update their belief to almost a similar 
agreement(Lindley, 2013). 
Moreover, Lindley did not accept the Taleb’s point of view and wrote a review that is 
further presented according to Aven (2013a). Lindley mentioned that the calculation of 
probability is enough for considering uncertainty. He assumed sequences of the independent 
trail with constant chances of success, assigning the uniform distribution for prior distribution 
over the interval of zero to one [ ]1,0 and stressed that there exist a fraction of swans that is black. 
Hence, the probability of the black swan (Failure in the experiment) almost appear and it is, 
therefore, not outside of the scope of the analysis. However, Aven mentioned two false 
assumptions in Lindley’s argument. First, the observation of Black Swan among the large 
population of the swan is not correct because the concept of black swan referrers to surprise 
extreme events. Second, when assuming the interval probability of black swan the uncertainty 
about a white swan is neglected. If the analyst assigns the prior probability for the white swan 
and then observation shows "n" white which n is a large population. Therefore, with Bayesian 
updating the likelihood of black swan observation is so small. For short, the inevitable 
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framework hides the possibility of surprises. In conclusion, this model is not enough to predict 
the surprises and alongside with the model, assessment should take the uncertainty into the 
consideration. 
2.1.1.1.4 FTA and ETA 
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) applies to quantify the probability of occurrence of the 
considered events. FTA and Event Tree Analysis (ETA) applying based on the fixed order of 
events and, therefore, they do not consider the interaction between system function and the 
undesirable events correctly. To deal with this limitation, analysts may apply a dynamic method 
such as dynamic event tree. Figure 2.1illustrates a simple bow-tie diagram with Fault Tree and 
Event Tree in a threat assessment. 
 
 
Figure 2.1: The bow-tie diagram with barriers, FTA, and ETA 
 
 FMECA cannot consider the redundancy of the system and FTA disregard the 
chronological order of events and ETA is time-consuming and error prone. FMEA, FTA, and 
Markov analysis need many assumptions. They are limited in dealing with the previous history 
of evolution. The memoryless feature of Markov chain let us forget the past and build the future 
upon the present values. However, for some reasons it is necessary to develop the model with 
all previous history of changing (Aven et al., 2007). Models are a mind-constructed algorithm 
that can cope with the existing ideas, and they are unable to predict beyond the designed 
framework. 
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2.1.2 Uncertainty-Based Risk Assessment 
Aven stated that there is no guarantee that the probability numbers unfold all 
uncertainties involving in an experiment or phenomena, that is way the uncertainty should be 
an element of risk picture(Aven, 2010). Hence, it is necessary to introduce an integrated 
framework for the risk picture that can reveal all necessary factors. Abrahamsen et al. (2010) 
believed in the integrated framework for safety management as an event, associated 
consequences, and the uncertainty involving the process. Abrahamsen et al. stressed that 
probability is the measure of uncertainty, yet, the risk is neither probability nor the expected 
value. Using probability to describe risk camouflage the uncertainty involving in the events and 
consequences. Additionally, Aven et al. criticised the probabilistic approach to risk analysis 
and mentioned, the PRA does not consider background knowledge assessment and surprise 
evaluation (Aven et al., 2014). 
Accordingly the risk picture in this approach can be ( )KP,U,C,A, in which U represent 
uncertainty and K stands for the background knowledge. In this approach, analysts try to have 
a list of top-ten undesirable events with a low probability of occurrence and adverse effect. 
Besides, analysts assess the background knowledge to identify the most reliable data for the 
assessment, ref (Abrahamsen et al., 2010). 
Accordingly, the probability interpretation refers to the subjective probability. Objective 
frequentist probability contains aleatory uncertainty about the experiments while, in subjective 
probability, the analyst describes the purely epistemic uncertainty about the future events based 
on the background knowledge.   
This knowledge-based probability is a description of epistemic uncertainty, according 
to background knowledge of contributors. Thus, the probability of an event A given the 
background knowledge ( )KAP | is assigner's degree of belief for occurring the undesirable 
event “A” with background knowledge “K” of the assessor. Therefore, assessor embeds his/her 
degree of belief with a number. It is important to assess the background knowledge because the 
probability number depends on the assigner's belief, and any further investigation depends on 
the background knowledge. Consequently, the probability will change if the background 
knowledge slightly changes. With this point of view, the constructed model is different from 
time to time using new data and expert judgement.  
Moreover, probability numbers should be interpreted in a way that can be 
understandable. This issue emphasised by Aven and Reniers (2013) that risk analysts should be 
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able to demonstrate the meaning of probability numbers. The paper mentioned above stated that 
probability should be meaningful in a way that helps managements and shareholders in 
decision-making. 
The idea of interpretation for probability arises because people understand each 
phenomenon using comparing it to a known measure. For example, people compare the distance 
with the known standard calls meter, and they compare feelings about the weather with the 
known measures like degree Celsius or degree Fahrenheit. De Finetti (1930), judged the 
uncertainty regarding the occurrence of undesirable event equivalent with the uncertainty in 
gambling. On the other hand, Lindley (2013)interpreted the uncertainty associated with the 
undesirable event comparable with the uncertainty regarding an Urn Standard. Both 
interpretation model present bellow. 
- Interpretation regarding Betting  
Understanding and interpreting the reality depends on people's need and has                         
a connection to the period of application. It seems that betting especially on horse racing was 
popular in the era of De Finetti; starting in the 20th century. This method presented by Aven and 
Reniers (2013) which rest on De Finetti(1930). 
This approach is similar to the gambling situation. In this approach, Probability of 
occurrence for event A can be interpreted as the known procedure of gambling. The likelihood 
of event A compares the amount of money the assessor willing to put on the table if he/she 
would receive a single unit of payment if event A occurs, and nothing otherwise. Conversely, 
the assessor willing to pay the amount of ( )( )AP−1 if he/she would receive a single unit of 
payment if the event “A” not occurs, and nothing otherwise.  
- Interpretation regarding an uncertainty standard  
This method developed by Professor Denis Lindley (2013).The assessor compares 
his/her degree of belief about the probability of occurrence of event A with a standard measure 
that is an urn. For example ( ) 1.0=AP means that the assessor judge the uncertainty associated 
with the occurrence of event A with a standard experiment. The uncertainty is equivalent to the 
uncertainty regarding the occurrence of a standard event of drawing a particular ball from an 
urn containing ten balls. Also, the balls in the urn should be fair. Fairness means that (1) there 
is no any single difference between balls (2) choosing balls from the urn is in the proper way 
without cheating.  
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This measure helps to understand world's phenomena using urn experiment. If, for 
example, the probability number is so small then the number of corresponding balls in urn 
standard can be increased such that; the interpretation will be meaningful. Randomness2in 
drawing a fair ball is an equally important aspect of this interpretation.  
It is possible to develop the argument to the more complex situation. For example, 
considering two undesirable events let’s say “A” and “B” with a probability of occurrence, for 
instance ( ) ( ) 15.0,1.0 == BPAP . Assuming an urn containing 100 balls in which 10 are red, 
and 15 are blue with all others in white. Then, the assessor can judge the uncertainty associated 
with the occurrence of both events, simultaneously. The event interprets as equivalent to the 
uncertainty regarding the occurrence of a standard event of drawing 25 coloured balls from this 
urn containing 100 balls. 
Note that, although the Urn interpretation has a link to the classical probability of 
drawing a ball from an urn the subjective probability is different from the objective probability. 
In the Urn Standard, the assessor compares the uncertainty about the occurrence of a real event 
A, with the uncertainty about a mind-constructed event B regarding the Urn Standard. Drawing 
balls from an urn is a classical probability for a mind-constructed event not for the event A, and 
analysts use this probability to interpret the subjective probability. 
2.1.2.1 Uncertainty 
Three different approaches exist for understanding uncertainty. The most used approach 
divides uncertainty into the epistemic and aleatory types. Here, three different approaches 
present and the second one is the reference that applies to the upcoming sections of the thesis. 
2.1.2.1.1 Ignorance and Variability 
In this classification, uncertainty has two categories, ignorance and variability. 
Ignorance denotes the partial incertitude due to the limitation of the empirical study and further 
research; new information or using new techniques can reduce it. However, variability has an 
                                                 
2
 If there exist 'n' different elements for a particular sampling each in which has two choices, then there exist (2n) 
factors involved in the assessment, and that is so much to investigate. Moreover, assessor still in doubt about 
existing any other factors include in the experiment. Experiment should be out of any conflict, means no 
interaction. Samples choose randomly and check again to prove this to overcome this issue. '' Random means that 
the withdrawal of the balls is not affected by anything''(Lindley, 2013, p. 47)  
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objective in reality that has no connection with new data or implementing new methods. The 
additional effort, in this case, can provide a better estimate, but the variability cannot be 
reduced(Ferson and Ginzburg, 1996).  
2.1.2.1.2 Aleatory and Epistemic Uncertainty 
Aleatory represent an unplanned situation that is more stochastic. Aleatory uncertainty 
relates to inherent variability that exists in the nature of phenomena, and it is irreducible.            
On the other hand, epistemic uncertainty refers to the lack of knowledge, and it is reducible. 
When analysts achieve to adequate information then, the probabilistic methods can be 
implemented to calculate the probability distribution. In contrast, information is very few and 
scattered for the condition of epistemic uncertainties to support objective probability. This 
condition results in subjective probability or interval specification in non-probabilistic methods. 
In some situations, data involves both categories of uncertainty. It is possible to define 
the share for each of them in the total uncertainty, e.g. (Eldred et al., 2011; Sun et al., 2012) 
2.1.2.1.3 Fuzziness, Incompleteness and Randomness 
David Blockley (2013) classified uncertainty in three conceptually distinctive 
characteristics which calls FIZ (fuzziness, incompleteness and randomness). He believes that 
characterization of uncertainty into the two categories of epistemic and aleatory types is not 
clever enough to deal with the practical situations. Fuzziness is imprecision or vagueness of the 
definition. Let’s consider this statement; 
 
“The risk related to riser/pipeline fire scenarios is small. Hence, the effect of 
protecting the escape routes from riser fires is small”. 
 
 
It is implicit either in the level of performance for escape routes and the intensity of the 
fire scenario. It sounds like epistemic to some extent, and it is reducible by increasing the 
information about fire scenario and level of performance for escape routes. Blockley according 
to Zadeh (1973) stated that since complexity increases in the system, the ability to make an 
accurate statement decreases until the precision and importance are mutually exclusive. For 
short, mathematic cannot model the fuzziness like in the theory of fuzzy sets.  
Incompleteness refers to whatever the analysts do not know. It is a part of epistemic 
uncertainty, but it is neglected. The sum of all probabilities equal to one and everything in this 
interval drops in fussy sets and what analysts do not know is not assigned with classical 
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probability. Randomness defines as a lack of knowledge in the pattern. Therefore, it is aleatory 
uncertainty. 
Assuming that ( )AP is the probability of occurrence of event A. These three types of 
uncertainty involve the calculation. The below-mentioned statement consists of both Fuzzy and 
incompleteness types of uncertainty. 
 
“The effect of protecting the escape routes from riser fires is small, but there exists 
some evidence to prove the importance of this improvement”. 
 
 
2.1.2.2 Black Swan 
Black Swan refers to the surprise in the eyes of assessors. It means a dangerous situation 
might exist even if the analysts did not consider or understand that. In fact, the Black Swan 
concept says if there is no swan with black colour in the US it is possible to see many swans in 
black in other parts of the world (Taleb, 2010). The Black Swan concept is not new in the world, 
but it presented and popularised by Taleb in 2007 in the context of risk management. For 
example, it is mentioned by Blockley (2013, p. 31)that David Hume in 1739 doubted this 
statement “evidence from the past could be used as evidence for the future.” 
Taleb described the black swan with three features, ref (Aven, 2013b). First, it is outside 
of the normal expectations because nothing in the past can prove the possibility of an event in 
the future. Second, it has severe consequences. Third, after happening, it is easy to think about 
it, and it is explainable. Additionally, Aven divided the surprises into three categories           
(Aven, 2014a, p. 12). 
- Unknown-unknown means these events and correspond probability are unknown for 
scientists. These events are difficult to include in assessments. 
- Surprise events are in comparison with analyst's risk picture. These events do not appear 
in the risk picture as a result of risk assessment. 
- Surprises with a very low probability of occurrence. 
Aven mentioned that the first category is hard to predict. However, the second and third 
category of surprise events are known for assessors. The second one refers to events that the 
assessor do not believe in happening them. Those scenarios are beyond the investigation of the 
risk analyst team. It might be due to the complexity of scenarios. Besides, it is also possible to 
overestimate the strength of applied barriers. The third category indicates the events that has 
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mentioned in the investigations but neglected due to the low probability of occurrence. It can 
happen when the assessor does not verify the strength of the information. 
To assess the surprises, Aven (2013) suggested an approach involving them in the risk 
assessment. The first step is, preparing all possible types of activities with low risk and address 
corresponding consequences and probability of occurrence. The second step is, reviewing all 
evidence of occurring these events. These two steps help to go insight the phenomena and 
predict the events that are possible to happen in the future. With this view, the MTO method 
can be the best approach for industries. The Standard(§3.4.1) suggested to find threats of 
different contributors include technical, organisational, and human resources. Similarly, for the 
purpose of the security risk assessment Abrahamsen et al. (2010)suggested the list of top-ten 
surprises for the safety section alongside with the probability-based approach. This method has, 
of course, application of the security section. The security police in Norway (PST) in the last 
report (NTV, 2014) summarised nine threats with the high impact in Norway and explained each 
in details.  
2.1.2.3 Strength of Knowledge 
In probability-based risk assessment, the procedure highlights the expected values and 
probability of occurrence. The risk defines with the expected value and certainly the probability 
calculation involves information, analysis, and expert judgements. The weakness point of the 
procedure is the used information and events beyond the scope of the analysis which mentioned 
as Black Swan in the previous section. The solution is to address the strength of the data. Aven 
(2013b) referred to that the strong knowledge the small level of uncertainty and suggested two 
methods of knowledge assessment. 
- Method 1 for assessing the strength of knowledge:  
In this method, direct grading and scoring are used to evaluate the strength of knowledge 
together with the probabilistic risk analysis. If following conditions exist, then the knowledge 
is inadequate. 
- The assumption shows strong simplification 
- Data are not available, or if any it is unreliable 
- Experts do not have any agreement with modelling, assumption, and so on 
- The mechanism of the phenomena is not well understood 
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In contrast, strong knowledge has these characteristics; availability of a reasonable 
assumption(s), reliable data, agreement among experts, and known mechanism for considered 
phenomena. 
- Method 2 for assessing the strength of knowledge:  
This method concentrates on identifying primary assumptions involved in the 
probabilistic analysis. Analysts use uncertainty factors for assumptions like the historical data 
to predict the future. Hence, uncertainty about assumptions should be clearly defined to 
understand the deviation of assumptions from established state. The scoring system shows the 
criticality of assumptions. If assumptions are strong, then corresponding deviation will be small, 
and then the uncertainty regarding the process is low. 
2.2 Security Risk Assessment 
2.2.1 Terror Definition 
The word terrorism is one of the most-used terms in a daily life of people in this era. 
Newspapers and TV-news contain these terms or the similar expressions every day. 
Governments and organisations apply many different definitions to cope with their existing 
issue(s). There is no unique definition worldwide, and the term terrorism is more dynamic such 
that the world leaders nominate various groups in a different way over the time. Despite 
different political behaviour, terrorism definitions almost contain the same characteristics. PST 
(Politiets sikkerhetstjeneste) in Norway has this definition for terrorism: 
 Terror activities are a serious crime, which often has a connection to the branches 
across the borders. Terrorist acts largely affect civil society, and the impact of 
terrorist acts go beyond the loss of lives and damage to property. It propagates 
through the fear and insecurity, ref (“Terrorisme | PST,” 2014). 
 
 
According to Matusitz (2013) most of the old definitions Involve three terms of (a)use 
of violence, (b) political objectives, and (c) propagating fear. The former terrorism propagated 
fear through using violence for political purpose(s). The goal was to attacks the particular 
target(s), and mainly secular groups used this method. However, the new terrorism behaviour 
indiscriminate objectives and attacks the large population. Mostly, it involves religious 
behaviour that deny other ways of life and try to propagate inflexible models of life. The old 
definition refers as classical terrorism while the modern and post-modern one aim to damage 
the population in high level, and also they use weapons. Moreover, post-modern terrorist use 
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extra powerful weapons such as chemicals and radioactive arms to suppress and eliminate their 
targets. The two features are, therefore, added to the definition. The first one is arbitrariness 
and indiscriminate targeting and the second one is to victimise civilians. It is crucial to have an 
integrated description to reflect all its aspects in the risk picture. Hence, the most used definition 
of terrorism presents here by Matusitz (2013, p. 4). 
 
Terrorism means creating fear by using violence for political or religious reasons. 
These intentional actions are mainly against civilians to reach a particular goal(s). 
Thus, terrorism is different from murder or the threats of the same level.  
 
 
To clarify the effect of a terrorist attacks two example present below. The former 
example refers to as a classical terrorist attack ( Terror in Sarajevo), and the latter one refers to 
as the modern terrorism ( September 11th). These two short examples describe how the world 
will change after such undesirable events.  
Example 2.1: Terror in Sarajevo 
The assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria and his wife in Sarajevo on 
28 June 1914 was the start point of the world war one that first was between Austria-Hungary 
and the Kingdom of Serbia. During four and a half year, many countries on both Entente side 
and central power side fought against each other. The Ottoman Empire helped Empire of 
Germany and Austria-Hungary(Cawood and McKinnon-Bell, 2002). The direct consequences 
of that war were about millions of fatalities, injuries and destroyed cities. The two significant 
consequence for the world war one were the revolution in Russia in October 1917 and 
Partitioning of the Ottoman Empire in 1920. Contributing the Ottoman Empire resulted in the 
creation of the new countries in the Middle East which causes many conflicts afterwards. The 
world war two was the indirect consequence of the world war one. Simply the terrorist plan by 
few people in Sarajevo resulted in the vast consequences in the history of the world. 
Example 2.2: September 11th 
The terrorist attack on September 11th, 2001 against World Trade Centre changes the 
history of the world. Many fatalities and injuries, collapsing famous stock markets worldwide, 
and the two wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were the direct consequences of the attack. Dropping 
economy in nearest and growth of radicalism in the Islamic countries and consequently in other 
areas are some of the indirect effects of that attack. 
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2.2.2 Safety and Security 
There are several differences between the concepts of safety and security. Thus, security 
assessment and safety assessment highlight different elements of the analysis. For example, the 
sinking of the Sleipner A offshore platform (1991) was the safety failure, and the two case 
examples mentioned above were the security issues relating to the criminal plan of invaders. In 
line with these definitions Reniers and Audenaert (2014) aggregated many ideas about this two 
concepts that present here. The authors defined safety risk assessment as analysing probability 
and consequences while they defined security risk assessment by analysing target, vulnerability 
and consequences.  
Table 2.1: The list of differences between safety and security 
Safety Security 
Incident is undesirable and unplanned. It is a man constructed plan. 
It is the result of an individual or groups plan. It is the result of human behaviour. 
Seldom a malicious action, and mainly without 
any wishes for considered output. 
Malicious action with wishes for the defined output. 
Hazard is observable and tangible. The threat is not observable and tangible. 
The source is domestic. The source is intentional. 
There is no invader. Caused by Invader. 
Quantitative or qualitative probability of 
occurrence. 
More qualitative approaches based on expert 
opinion. The probability of occurrence may be 
available in case of existing relevant information. 
Risk is the nature of experiments and 
phenomena. 
The threat is the nature of security-related risk with 
high degree of uncertainty. 
This table ispired by (Egeli, 2014; Reniers and Audenaert, 2014). 
 
The more precise definition of safety provided by (Aven, 2014b). Aven stressed that as 
long as events and consequences are unknown then we cannot mention high or low safety. 
Consequently, the term safety defines by reference to the acceptable risk. He adapted a graph 
that illustrated the safe situation within two risk approaches. In the probability-based risk 
assessment, the safe boundary is much smaller than the acceptable area of risk. In this approach, 
epistemic uncertainty involves the analysing procedure for both causes and consequences. 
Conversely, if analysts implement the uncertainty-based perspective then, the safe and 
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acceptable risk area coexist. Aven also believed that being in a safe area is a subjective 
judgement and, therefore, it defers from one institution to other. He believed that the probability 
is the measure of uncertainty, yet not all aspects of safety reflect in expected value and 
probability numbers.  This issue presents widely in (§2.1). 
In brief, there are three key differences between safety and security mentioned 
in(Guikema and Aven, 2010). First, terrorist risk adapt to the risk management program because 
it is a clever plan. The failure of the system may change due to the risk management program, 
but the initiating event does not alter. Second, there is no consensus among experts about using 
probability for the terrorist attack, e.g. (Aven, 2008) due to high uncertainty and The Black 
Swan(§2.1.2.2). Thus, calculating the probability of attack is difficult like in Willis approach 
(§2.2.3). Accordingly, a traditional cost-benefit analysis that revolve around comparing the 
likelihood of cost and benefit has not a real meaning. The third difference is the restriction to 
the loss of liberties. Thus, defining measures to reduce risk may interrupt the individual 
freedom. 
2.2.3 Security Risk Description by Willis 
Many researchers have been working on the concept of the terrorist risk assessment for 
decades. Each definition may highlight different aspects of the risk. However, the broadly used 
definition by the experts and analysts is the contribution of threats, vulnerabilities, and 
consequences(Willis and Rand Corporation, 2005)3. The Standard in Norway suggests almost 
the same contributors for the security risk assessment (§3). The three parameters present in the 
following paragraphs according to these authors. The probability of an attack defines as                   
a particular threat and target with assigned consequences if a successful attack occurs. In this 
definition, risk involves threat, vulnerability, and consequences that his the intersection 
between the three defined factors, see Figure 2.2.  
 
( ) ( ) ConsequeneerabilityVuThreatCASPAPRisk ××=××= ln|  
                                                 
3
 RAND Corporation is a non-Profit organisation in US. 
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Figure 2.2: Security risk diagram 
2.2.3.1 Threat  
The first step in this definition is to define the threat. In the safety risk assessment 
initiating event defines as hazard while, in security risk analysis, it is preferred to define the 
initiating event as a threat. The threat definition is the most challenging part of this approach, 
and Aven mentioned “what you have not identified, you cannot deal with”(Aven, 2008, p. 39).  
Human life and infrastructures such as; roads, tunnels, dams, and industries can be the 
target for a terrorist attacks. For example, the foundations that are not so far from the urban 
areas are more likely to be the goal for terrorist organisations. Another example can be a dam 
nearby an entirely populated region that is an excellent target for the terrorist attack. The threat 
is meaningful when both intent and capability exist in a person or in an organisation to offend 
a particular target in a given period. An attack involves weapons, transportation and delivery, 
target, and so on, and each target may have unique characteristics. Hence, analysts should 
consider all aspects of the possible targets in the risk assessment and decision-making. Here, 
the threat is measured as the probability of attacking a particular target in a defined way during 
the distinctive period.  
Threat=P (occurring attack) 
 
The terrorist attack on September 11th involved both intent and capability. Indeed,         
the Intent came from the radicalism behaviour toward life, and the capability was about the 
international branches with various experts in the scientific areas. 
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2.2.3.2 Vulnerability  
The second parameter of this formulation is a vulnerability. In fact, not all existing 
targets are deemed to be equally vulnerable. A bridge in the long distance to the city is more 
vulnerable than the city’s airport because of the security concentration surrounding the airport. 
The University in Kenia, which was the goal of a terrorist attack in April 2015, is more 
vulnerable than The White House in the US. Therefore the infrastructure or the sensitive 
destination should be accurately defined to have complete information about it. According to 
Haimes(2004) mentioned by Willis and Rand Corporation (2005) vulnerability is the inherent 
state of any system or infrastructure when an attack occurs by an enemy. Thus, vulnerability is 
defined as the probability of any possible damage to human being or assets for a particular 
attack in a defined way during the distinctive period.  
The vulnerability is meaningful if and only if the attack yields to damage, nothing 
otherwise. For example, a glass showcase is vulnerable to the rubble whereas the concrete wall 
is entirely safe if hitting with the rubble or similar materials. Furthermore, a concrete wall is 
inherently stronger than a glass showcase. Hence, the formula does not involve the magnitude 
of an attack. Thus, the damage to the target should be considered in the formula. 
 
Vulnerability=P (Attack yield to damage| occurring attack) 
2.2.3.3 Consequences  
The third parameter is all possible consequences of the particular attack. It shows the 
quantity and the type of the potential loss and structural damages. In general, damage remarks 
as fatalities, injuries, economic or political issues and so forth. Thus, the consequence is almost 
always uncertain. Hence, many authors introduce some methods to build a distribution instead 
of just highlighting the expected value. In this context, Haimes (2005) tried to turn our attention 
to tails of the assigned distribution. He believed that the extreme events might happen in the 
tails of the distributions. However, some other believe in the qualitative assessment for 
considering possible unforeseen. They suggested uncertainty-based risk assessment instead of 
Probability-based assessment, e.g. (Aven, 2014a). Here, according to Willis and RAND the 
consequence defines as the expected magnitude of any possible damage to people and assets if 
a successful attack occurs in a defined way during the particular period. 
 
Consequence= E (damage| successful attack which leads to damage) 
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2.3 Decision-Making Frameworks 
2.3.1 Cautionary Principle 
The cautionary principle is one of the basic principles of safety management. The 
principle stated that, when facing to uncertainty, the standard and guidance principle is to be 
caution. For example, the Norwegian regulation stipulates to use the fireproof panels to protect 
the living quarters on an offshore installation. Although the probability of fire for the living 
quarter and exposed areas of the facility might be judged as low the consequences are high, and 
it may happen time to time. Although the principle applies broadly in the safety regulation, it 
is, of course, possible to implement this principle in the public sector for treating security issues, 
ref (Aven and Vinnem, 2007). Thus, being caution means to apply the minimum safety for the 
industries or, in a broader sense, applying the minimum security for the society regarding 
people, the environment, and assets. 
In case of an uncertain situation of work in industries, the cautionary principle should 
be adopted for managing the risk. Some experts suggested vital considerations when applying 
the cautionary principle for safety management that some of them is useful to apply in the 
security sector. The requirements for the safety section presents according to (Aven and 
Abrahamsen, 2007; Aven and Vinnem, 2007) in the following;  
- The robust design aims to resist the system to any deviation from the standard condition. 
For the security assessment, there is no clear condition like in the mechanical product 
line. Here, the aim is to adopt the procedure to find the possible threats, e.g. monitoring 
suspicious activities. 
- Flexible design means to operate a new situation in case of any hazards. For the terrorist 
attack assessment, analysts shall review the existing procedure of security investigation 
to overcome the possible adaptive terrorist plan.  
- Applying safety barriers and improving the capabilities of barriers. It is applicable for 
the security reasons. 
- Quality control of the whole system time to time.  
- Applying the precautionary principle which means implementing measure to reduce risk 
or stop carrying out the activity. 
- The cautionary principle suggests applying the ALARP principle for the system safety. 
The principle can adapt for both safety and security section, see §2.3.6 and §4.3. 
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Reminding Example 2.2, after the September 11th event the cautionary principle led 
governments to intensify the cautionary actions at the airports. These rules are the minimum 
measures to avoid the attacks with low probability and severe consequences. In some countries, 
authorities judged to use insensible armed police in the planes that are the minimum 
requirement, according to political justification, adapting this fact that the terrorist plan can 
frequently change. Although the regulation may be costly for the society, the authorities take 
more caution than applying cost-benefit analysis, see §2.3.3.    
2.3.2 Expected Utility Theory 
The expected utility theory is a framework for decision-making under uncertainty. This 
theory states that the best safety alternative is the one with the highest expected utility. The 
utility is the degree of usefulness and, therefore, the principle seeking the profitability and 
usefulness for the investment in the future. At the point of decision-making no one knows, 
exactly, what would be useful in the future even what would be the result of the existing 
decision? Hence, the expectation is the idea of decision-maker according to the outcome of the 
analysis and predicting the future. Thus, the goal is to maximise the utility of the project. Some 
scientists believe that starting from the rational condition the expected utility can be useful as 
the decision criteria, ref (Aven and Vinnem, 2007). However, there is no justification for this 
rationale in the framework. 
The procedure consists of two parts. First, the utility defines for each calculated 
probability because the utility assignment has the same level of importance as the probability 
calculation. Second, the expected utility is capable of summation and so, the expectation is the 
sum of all utilities in the category. One method to assign the utility for different elements is to 
use the lottery approach, ref (Aven and Vinnem, 2007).In this method, the decision-maker 
assign the utility of one for the best scenario and the zero for the worst one. After that, they 
should assign the utility for all other outcomes in this interval. The decision-maker compares 
the best result with a chance of u=1 in one hand and, on the contrary, another outcome with the 
certain chance of ui. Hence, the decision-maker assigns the utility for the outcomes when she/ 
he is indifferent between these two chances, u and ui. The expected utility, thus, calculates as 
following: 
[ ] ( ) ∑
=
×==
n
i
ii uPXEuUtilityE
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Utility theory allows the decision-makers to reflect the like or dislike for a particular 
consequence by giving weight in comparison to the expected value. When decision-maker 
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dislike the negative outcome she/he gives more weight to the expected utility of the outcome 
than the expected value. From the viewpoint of the risk averse ( ) ( )xuExEu < while risk seeker 
gives more weight to the expected utility than the expected value ( ) ( )xuExEu > . A neutral 
decision maker is indifferent between the utility, and the expectation, then she/he choose
( ) ( )xuExEu = , ref (Abrahamsen and Aven, 2012).   Aven and Vinnem (2007) according to the 
previous literature stated that the real situation are complicated, and every individual has an 
own preference for different outcomes. Further, the utility approach is not suitable for the group 
decision-making. Thus, it is not a fruitful method for group decision-making. Indeed, making a 
decision needs discussion and negotiation. Thus, mathematical optimization is not a complete 
tool for this reason. It is hard to assign the utility function for all outcomes and, in fact, there is 
no rational condition but individual preference in this model. For short, it might be suitable for 
starting the process but it is not the exact answer to make a decision. 
2.3.3 Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) 
This tool developed for evaluating the public policy issues by measuring the benefit and 
the cost of the project, comparing them with the value. The expected monetary value calculates 
through this formula ( )[ ]xCEi − in which i is the advantage of the investment for a particular 
alternative and ( )xC is the cost of x fatalities. Here, the decision-maker shall specify the value of 
the statistical life. When applying the model to a more complex situation of industries, analysts 
face to various elements and issues. For example, the framework considers the time value of 
money and the rate of return which is the proportion of the original investment. The value of 
all elements, both market and non-market goods, transfer into monetary.   
The framework is to use the common scale value that should be a country’s currency. 
Aven and Vinnem (2007) stressed that transferring goods into the monetary is an easy task 
because it depends on the society’s tendency to pay for a particular product. However, 
transferring the non-market goods like human life and the environmental issues are more 
difficult.  
Note that the method developed for the public policy issues and, therefore, it works with 
the cost of fatalities. Two approaches has suggested for determining the value of statistical life 
(VSL). The revealed approach aims to derive all values from actual choices. However, the 
questionnaire approach tends to investigate individual tendency toward risk. In this approach, 
decision-makers willing to pay under the different hypothetical situation, ref (Aven and 
Vinnem, 2007). 
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Additionally, in the private section, the stakeholders make an investment in the project 
during its lifetime. Thus, the value of time and discounting rate of the value is also considered. 
The goal is to compute the [ ]NPVE . In this formula, the time value of the invested money in its 
period involves the calculation by using the appropriate rate of return. 
[ ] ( )∑= +=
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In the formula
tr is the expected rate of return at year t, considering the time value of the 
investment. The rate of return discount the cash flow
tX at year t. Since the cash flow in the 
future is uncertain, analysts should calculate the expectation of the cash flow ( )tXE taking into 
account the uncertainty about future, i.e. (Aven and Flage, 2009).The method helps to improve
[ ]NPVE and ICAF(Implied Cost of Averting a Statistical Fatality) by involving risk and 
uncertainty in the formula.  
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Note that, in this model the idea is to use the correct value for all attributes. Considering 
the cost of life may vary, depends on the different situation. Thus, another alternative is to 
present the result as the function of used assumption. It is the pragmatic view of the cost-benefit 
approach. This view allows to exclude some attributes that are difficult to transfer to value. 
Both traditional cost-benefit analysis and the pragmatic view provide decision support, and they 
are not a concrete recommendation, ref (Abrahamsen et al., 2011; Aven and Vinnem, 2007). 
2.3.4 Cost-Effectiveness Analysis 
Cost-effectiveness method is a framework aims to compare safety measures to support 
decision-making. The index of effectiveness uses instead of net value for each measure and the 
indices compare to each other to choose the most effective measure. The model take into 
account the decision maker’s consideration regarding outcomes. A cost-effective measure has 
a characteristic as following, ref (Abrahamsen et al., 2011). 
- The measure is effective but with less cost. 
- The costly measure should be more beneficial to worth the added cost. 
- The less efficient measure shall have less cost. 
- The measure is cost saving with better or at least equal outcome to the safety or security. 
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The framework objective is to define the ratio of cost-effectiveness for each measure 
and compares all alternatives such that at least one of those criteria mentioned above exist. It is 
the ratio between the investment cost associated with safety measure and the total effect related 
to loss of lives if measure implemented. At the end, the ratio for the measure compares with the 
reference value. This method presents here according to (Abrahamsen et al., 2011). 
- iC denotes the investment cost associated with safety measure. 
- iZ denotes the total effect. This parameter relates to loss of lives if implementing the 
measure i . 
- R denotes the reference value. This reference shows the tendency of the decision-maker 
to pay to gain one unit of effectiveness.  
The effectiveness ratio defines as ii ZC for each measure and when they compare to each 
other if 2211 ZCZC < , then the measure number 1 is more efficient. The decision maker's 
consideration involves in R and, therefore, the ratio compares to the reference value. The 
measure 1 is effective as long as the ratio is less than the reference value RZC <11 . The 
weakness of the method is the uncertainty involving the calculation of the parameters. 
2.3.5 Multi-Attribute Analysis 
It is a decision support tool that analyse the consequences of various measures for the 
different attributes. This procedure does not transfer all attributes into a comparable unit and 
instead uses different ratios for different attributes. In the analysis, some elements may define 
by quantities while political issues and social considerations define qualitatively,                         
ref (Abrahamsen et al., 2011; Aven and Vinnem, 2007). 
2.3.6 ALARP Principle 
The ALARP is one of the fundamental principles of risk assessment. The principle 
stated that the risk should be reduced to a level that is as low as reasonably practicable. The 
principle applied to different interpretation such as; “So Far as Is Reasonably Practicable” and” 
As Low as Reasonably Achievable”. However, The English court of appeal judged the principle 
as reasonably practicable in 1949. The court also stated owner handles the calculation regarding 
the risk. The owner place the risk on one scale while the involved sacrifice put on the other 
scale regardless of the cost of applying the measure, ref (Jones-Lee and Aven, 2011).  
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Reducing risk in practice imposes a cost on the society and, therefore, the principle 
applies in connection with the CBA (Cost Benefit Analysis).  In line with CBA, ALARP 
principle stated that risk reducing measure should be taken to the level that cost of doing so is 
not “grossly disproportionate” or “disproportionate” to the benefit of the measure. The two 
definitions are slightly different, ref the discussion by Jones-Lee and Aven (2011). The 
difficulty of implementing measure is to compare cost and benefit and, here, CBA is                          
a framework to examine the cost with the gained benefit. In the more practiced cases,                   
the analysts refer to the existing procedure of safety practice but when facing the new situation, 
the effectiveness of the measure should be judged according to the associated cost. However, 
the benefit of applying the measure is not straightforward to compute.  
 
 
Figure 2.3: Procedure for implementing ALARP, ref (Aven and Vinnem, 2007) 
 
Figure 2.3 illustrates the procedure of doing ALARP. The procedure requires that cost 
shall not be gross disproportionate to the benefit, means that cost should be lower than benefit. 
For this reason, the benefit shall be transferred to the monetary value that is, of course, 
problematic. Thus, the first step is to perform a qualitative analysis of the benefit and the risk 
reducing measure. If the cost is judged to be low then gross disproportion is not the case and if 
high the alternative approach is to calculate cost-effectiveness indices (§2.3.4) and [ ]NPVE . 
The framework suggests to imply the measure if [ ]NPVE is positive or ICAF is smaller than a 
small number (some few millions), means that it is not gross disproportion. If none of those two 
conditions fulfilled, analysts assess the uncertainty and all other factors that have not considered 
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in previous steps. The checklist includes following points and if most of these points are met 
the gross disproportion is not appropriate, ref (Guikema and Aven, 2010): 
 
- The uncertainty involving in the process and the effect of the applied measure of 
reducing uncertainty. 
- The list involves the relation between the measure and manageability.  
- The effect of applying measure on the robustness. 
- The measure should involve the best available technology(BAT). It is to ensure that the 
used technology is up to date and not using the old systems. 
- The unsolved problem(s) and possible conflicts between personal- safety and work 
environment area is defined. 
 
The ALARP principle may interpret in line with the Tolerability of Risk (TOR). TOR 
has three levels that are “broadly acceptable”, “tolerable” and “unacceptable”. The tolerable 
area between two bonds shows the risk that can drop as low as reasonably practicable. In the 
safety risk assessment, it might be meaningful to compare ALARP with the cost-benefit 
analysis. However, when facing to the security assessment, the consequences may be enormous 
such that consideration of the cost of risk-reducing measures may not easy to calculate. In case 
of security assessment and related consequences, the cost of doing the security measure is more 
straightforward than confronting the risk, e.g. (Jones-Lee and Aven, 2011). 
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3 Security Risk Assessment Concerning the Norwegian Standard 
 
Figure 3.1: Security Risk Management(NS 5832, 2014) 
 
The standard contains the requirement for doing the assessment in the particular area. 
Hence, Standard shall contains clear definitions and straightforward procedure. In the social 
section, the outcome of an undesirable event might be enormous involving vagueness and        
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lack of proper knowledge. Therefore, the definition of risk and the considered elements in the 
risk picture should highlight surprises (§2.1.2.2) and used data (§2.1.2.3). 
In this section, we outline and assess the plausibility of the Norwegian standards for 
civil protection against intentionally undesirable actions. For this purpose, we can review the 
standards number NS 5831 for risk management and standard number NS 5832 for risk 
analysis. The used terminology in these two Standards presents in NS 5830 which does not 
mention here. The weakness points of the process discuss in §4.2. Here the steps are illustrated 
in Figure 3.1according to NS 5832 (2014). 
Risk management is a process to make suitable decisions based on identified risks. The 
objective is to achieve an acceptable degree of risk. All steps have a connection to the decision-
maker. The process results in establishing a report to decision-makers and stakeholders. The 
final document consists of risk picture concerning the defined security assessment with all 
assumptions and evaluation procedures. Hence, analysts can review the case in the future and 
re-evaluate the analysis to make a new decision or adding extra measures. 
The first step of the process is to define different elements of risk management. 
Norwegian Standard (NS 5831, 2014)considers various steps of doing the assessment for the 
purpose of security risk management.   
3.1 Defining Needs 
The first thing before managing risk is to define the need(s). It means to describe either 
existing or the predicted future problem(s). It is the judgement of experts that predict the 
future’s need, according to their experience. In line with this Standard, the risk has two parallel 
aspects; evaluating potential gain and possible loss. The Standard mentioned that when 
assessing actions and accepting risk, positive points are also appropriate to evaluate. The 
Standard mentions some examples of the potential gain such as increasing profit and marked 
share. On the other hand, the potential loss is damage to values, lack of fair access, and loss of 
reputation(NS 5831, 2014). 
The Standard considered four strategies to manage pure risk. The first strategy is to stay 
away from any process or action that causes relevant risk. The second strategy is to transfer risk 
to others. The third strategy is to accept the risk. The last one is about implementing measures 
to reduce or eliminate the risk. Standard put attention on the positive points in the risk 
management which has a link to risk. The five elements of the risk management present in the 
following according to the Standards (Figure 3.1). 
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3.2 Planning 
It is a part of the management system for all facilities. The risk management may involve 
different analysis for various purposes at different levels. The aim of this step is to make a clear 
plan and to document all necessary activities in the particular area of investigation. 
Additionally, all responsibilities identify for involving parties. The Standard also stated that the 
complexity of the analysis, available time and information, and consideration managerial 
influence the scope of the analysis. Furthermore, the analysis should involve unintentional 
actions that may lead to the disaster. Shortly, in this step the goal of the risk analysis defines 
clearly to use in the next steps.  
3.3 Risk Analysis 
Here the security risk analysis defines as risk assessment and evaluation of strategies 
and measures. The Standard defined the scope of risk management on the type of existing and 
future challenges. The risk analysis affects the risk-reducing actions and strategies, ref NS 5832 
(2014). The analysis discusses different solutions with different costs for the considered 
problem that shall result in defining the risk picture at the end of the assessment. 
The analysis identifies the problems, break down all factors and assess all strategies and 
necessary measures. This structure includes reducing measures and gives them priorities to deal 
with the identified risk. This part is somehow conducts with the planning phase. It means the 
structure of the analysis constructs in the planning stage. Furthermore, Standard stressed that 
analysts should evaluate and complete the previous steps of the process. In each phase, new 
knowledge may be revealed such that it is necessary to reassess the previous phases. Moreover, 
Standard stipulated the documentation and connection between process and decision-maker in 
all steps. In fact, it is appropriate to turn the attention back to the previous phases and reassess 
the past steps to reveal the missed points and possibly misleading paths. 
In line with the Standard, the implementation of the analysis should connect to      
decision-makers. The stakeholders and policy makers put their attention on the process and 
define the vital points for problem definition, analysis, and judgement. It is similar to       
decision-making model under uncertainty by (Aven, 2008) which all phases has a connection 
to decision-makers and stakeholders (Figure 3.2). Furthermore, according to the Standard the 
analyst team shall document all steps of the process. The process may include resources, 
On How to Describe Security Risk? 
36 
 
methods, and evaluations. The documentation let the analysts review and continue the process 
in the future.  
There exist a section so-called “critical thinking” in the standard. The critical thinking 
emphasised that analysts should apply a systematic and standard way to collect and evaluate 
the different type of data. Using standard ways of data collection allows to ensure the 
validity4and the reliability5of existing data. Indeed, the advice motivates us to refresh our 
understanding of the risk picture and the new framework for the assessment. 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Decision-making under uncertainty by (Aven, 2008, p. 10) 
 
3.3.1 Coordinating 
This step more focuses on the scope clarification and resource allocation. The risk 
analyst group shall document the further resource requirements if there is a particular need for 
more economic resources. In fact, the Standard focuses on paperwork and restates that analysts 
shall document all assumptions, sources of information and participation. However, it is not the 
scope of this thesis. In line with the numerical value and assumptions, it is necessary to clarify 
the dependency between them. The process shall inform decision-maker that to how extent the 
numerical values depend on the assumptions and hence, how changing the assumption will 
affect the predictions. Aven (2008) suggested the sensitivity analysis for this reason. 
                                                 
4
 Validity means being relevant in connection to the highlighted problem, ref (NS 5832, 2014). 
5
 Reliability means data comes from credible sources, ref (NS 5832, 2014). 
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3.3.2 Value Assessment 
The assessment of risk consists of several steps that result in risk picture at the end. The 
process starts with value assessment. According to the Standard it is the entity that handles 
identification, evaluation and ranking the assets and resources. Moreover, the expected future 
asset may be reviewed and evaluated in the assessment. Identifying the values (such as people 
and assets) is the basis for further investigation and put a priority on all risky sources. Standard 
takes many dimensions into consideration such as; environment, the economy, reputation and 
freedom of speech and suppose that the analyst team apply the qualitative assessment of the 
process. Indeed, value assessment consists of different perspectives like individuals, 
organisations, national and international aspects. 
3.3.3 Determining the Security Target 
After value determination, managers and stakeholders determine the goals. This step 
has a link to decision-makers in which they determine the acceptable condition before and after 
any possible undesirable events. They shall describe the main points before and after an 
undesirable event.  
3.3.4 Assessing Threat 
The third step is threat assessment. This step identifies all possible actors using public 
information, data from the security police, and agencies. Moreover, the expert judgement can 
be a reliable source of finding and identifying any possible threats. Further, the threat may be 
from different categories such as groups or individuals. The Standard considers two main 
purposes for the threat assessment in the context of security. The first goal is to identify the 
actors. By this point, all possible actors Including individuals or groups of attackers identify by 
the analysis team. In this context, expert opinion is the best source of this investigation. The 
second purpose is early notification of any possible threats so that emergency preparedness may 
implement to withstand a potential attack. When undesirable events happen, the system should 
be ready to deal with the situation with minimum loss in values. 
3.3.5 Evaluation and Choosing Scenarios 
Based on defined values and threat assessment, scenarios are prepared. The scenarios 
are the source for further evaluation, and they describe how threats affect the targets. Standard 
mentioned the negative effects on the target because according to that the impact of the positive 
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point should also evaluate in the sense that they may help to improve the situations. 
Furthermore, the number of considered scenarios should be sufficient. The scenarios help the 
managers and analysts to have a clear understanding of the situation and also the discerption 
should not be complex.  
In this phase, bow-tie diagram is the easiest and the most approachable way to illustrate 
the scenarios. For each scenario, a bow-tie diagram (Figure 2.1) illustrates the undesirable 
events and all preventive and mitigation barriers on the left and right side of the diagram.           
On the left side of the diagram, FTA analysis starts with the threats and end up with the 
undesirable event. In front of the bow-tie diagram, the vulnerability defines the targets and 
barriers. 
3.3.6 Assessing Vulnerabilities 
According to defined scenarios and what is unfolding in value assessment and threat 
assessment the entity evaluate the vulnerability of the targets. Evaluation of barriers and 
assessing the resistant of the system is the scope of vulnerability assessment. Analysts shall 
assess to what extent the existing barriers defend against an undesirable attack. Everything 
depends on the scenarios and all factors within the area of technology, organization and human 
resources should be involved in the process.  
3.3.7 Evaluating Pure Risk 
For each scenario, risk assessment describes the value, threat, and vulnerability which 
conclude with a level of risk for each scenario. The collected information of three parameters 
uses to describe the pure risk for each scenario. The Standard defines the pure risk as the 
potential for loss and not for profit. 
 For each evaluation, uncertainty shall be described. The Standard gives due attention 
to the assessment of uncertainty in the scenarios. Acceptance of this advice would be more 
practical even if the uncertainty involves in the risk picture. This issue will further discuss in 
(§4.2). 
3.3.8 Presenting the Risk Picture 
In this approach, threat, vulnerability, and values visualise the risk. These factors 
presented in §2.2.3, and the aim of risk picture is to explain all possible events and 
consequences. The risk picture illustrates an overview of risk to the decision-maker and the 
purpose of this is to provide the best possible basis for further security risk management. 
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Additionally, Standard emphasised that a comprehensive approach to risk should also highlight 
the potential gain. 
3.3.9 Evaluating Strategy 
In this step, decision-maker defines the integrated framework to deal with risk. 
According to the strategy that is chosen to handle the risk the assessment shall include                     
a description of the different options and consequences. Note that Standard uses four different 
strategies for handling pure risk. These strategies are to avoid risk, to transfer risk, accept the 
risk or reduce risks. Based on relevant framework one or more strategies shall define to manage 
the risk. Here different entities may choose different strategies that construct the overall 
approach. Strategies are different in different sections, and the overall approach should take all 
targets into consideration. Hence, decision-maker may choose the combination of strategies, 
and finally they make a decision on the basis of these considerations. 
Removing or reducing the risk on one hand and accepting the risk, on the contrary, 
depends on the existing situation. Hence, decision-maker considers all relevant factors as the 
potential for the gain in the final decision. 
3.3.10 Evaluating Action 
The analysis may address various possibilities and consequences. The decision-maker 
shall choose individual measure or group of measures to withstand the severe outcomes of 
different threats. Choosing measure is in relation to strategies to manage risk and technological, 
organisational, and human resources are relevant to select the proper measure(s). Of course,     
the cost of doing the measures and the effect of measures shall be considered.  
The decision-maker shall define what is acceptable? Standard suggests accepting            
the risk in case the condition, benefits gain, or cost of implementing measure(s) dictate. The 
decision-maker shall determine the choice of measure. 
3.4 Risk Treatment 
The risk analysis shall end up with the risk picture. By now, we have the proper elements 
to deal with the possible future situations. After choosing involved factors in the risk picture 
and also choosing the appropriate strategy to address the risk it is time to apply necessary 
actions. The assessment deals with the possibilities and consequences of choosing or declining 
of these measures. It mentioned before, measures to prevent or reduce the risk depends on the 
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technology, organisation, and human values. Standard underlined the cost-effective analysis 
and assessing the effect of the measures about security goals. 
Standard gives the order to reassess the security goals after choosing strategies and 
actions and also assessing associated consequences. It means a decision-maker shall decide on 
the acceptable security risk. With this view, the conditions, frameworks, expected gains, and 
cost might dictate to accept the high-security risk. 
3.4.1 Implementation 
As we have seen, after the analysis phase has been done process goes to the management 
part. This step is to implement the objective of the measure. It means how and when the measure 
should be taken in the sense that reduces or eliminate the risk.  In the previous phase, the 
strategy and measure decided and in this step analysts set the timetable for necessary action(s). 
The analysts make the instruction for all actions comprises of technical and organizational 
measures or human resources.  
The aim of this step is to coordinate the relation between measures and all other factors 
and hence, it is necessary to have the plan to implement all measures. Later, in the verification 
phase the timetable, measures and other factors are used. 
3.4.2 Verification of the Process 
Another important step of the process is the verification phase. The analysis shall 
evaluate whether the implementation of the measure(s) helps to achieve the goals. Here, 
analysts define the subjected area for verification. Also, the verification step should assess the 
conditions and make sure they remain constant during the analysis. In this step, analysts plan 
measurements, targets, and. The Standard mentioned that the verification implement in an 
acceptable way. Therefore, analysts should implement some accepted way according to the 
scientific literature, i.e., (Dedianous and Fievez, 2006).  
3.4.3 Corrective Actions  
After verification step if some circumstances failure to meet the defined requirements, 
measures should be implemented. If verification reveals any deviation from demand, then 
corrective action choose to apply. If decision-maker recognize the deviation as small and 
acceptable then, other strategies might be selected like staying away from risk or transferring it 
to other parts. If decision-makers decide to apply any corrective measure, the application should 
be planned such that the goal, the detail work and the deadline to finish the process is defined.  
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4 Discussion 
4.1 Is Willis Approach Fruitful, Concerning Uncertainty? 
The advantages of the formula presented in detail by (Willis and Rand Corporation, 
2005). The authors mentioned three advantages for this method. First, it is beneficial for 
comparing risk across the different targets. Second, the method gives the explicit mapping 
between risk and management strategies and finally, the method helps to improve preparedness 
against risk and decrease the effects of damage. The only mentioned challenge through the 
approach is to find and to understand the source of uncertainties. 
Willis and Rand recognized two sources of uncertainties in the context of terrorist risk. 
The former one is errors in the parameter estimation, and the later one is about evaluating 
different consequences(Willis and Rand Corporation, 2005). In this method, all three 
parameters represented by numbers. Moreover, different consequences compare together using 
numbers. The sources for uncertain numbers mentioned as: 
1. Terrorist goals, motivation, and capabilities are uncertain sources for threats 
2. Damage assessment as the uncertain source for consequences 
It seems the formula is good prepared and considers enough factors, but there exist 
another sound in terms of the risk assessment concept that does not believe so much in such 
probability numbers. The definition of three factors may be useful and complicated enough, 
and it applies widely in practice, but still the formula cannot reveal the uncertainty about the 
causes and consequences of the phenomena. Despite the positive point that mentioned by 
Willis, Aven (2008)criticised this definition on two important points. First, the expected value 
misleads the surprise events with low probability and huge consequences. Second, Willis 
considered the true probability for the analysis that is not meaningful. The likelihood of the 
security risk depends on assumptions and suppositions and, therefore, it is a subjective 
probability. Shortly, there is no true probability for the undesirable event in the security section. 
The third weakness point of this approach is the uncertainty assessment.  Even though Willis 
mentioned the uncertainty involving in calculating three elements, this view does not reflect the 
uncertainty as one of the main element of the risk picture. 
Calculating ( )AP means quantification of all existing information. To perform this, intent 
and motivation of the attackers and their abilities to movement and adapt to the defenders plan 
present as a probability number(Ezell et al., 2010). All three parameters of terrorist risk are 
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conditional on the existing knowledge ( )kAP | . With another word, all probabilities are 
subjective based on the information and expert judgment. Thus, the assigned probability is 
reliable for the present situation. Thus, changing the defensive program or further intelligence 
from various sources make changes in the likelihood of the threat, and it is, therefore, necessary 
to assess again (Ezell et al., 2010).  In case of enormous consequences like in the terrorist attack, 
it does not matter the probability of occurrence is x or y (Aven, 2008).  
The significant challenge to defeat the terrorist attack is that the terrorism is an enemy 
armed with information and has the capacity of analysing all possibilities and limitation        
(Ezell et al., 2010). The terrorist can adapt the considered plan with all applied barriers and 
deterrent programs. Hence, to establish the preventive program in a long-term and protective 
plans to defeat and thwart the attacks we need to use all possible models. Ezell et al.(2010) 
mentioned that applying a single method is not reasonable to deal with this kind of challenges. 
The second weakness point of the Willis approach to security risk assessment is to use 
he expected value. The expected value is the average result of doing the experiment in the long 
run. In §2.2.3 consequences of a terrorist attack formulated as the expected value of the damage. 
According to Aven (2010), Daniel Bernoulli(1738) challenged this idea for the first time. He 
stressed that the utility of any item is more important than the price of that. Aven mentioned 
that the consequences of the terrorist attack could be extremely high in both national and 
international levels. Hence, the expected value cannot predict such an unforeseen. Also 
uncertainty according to such an extreme consequences is high, and the existing knowledge 
does not help us to predict what would be the next disaster and its associated consequences. In 
the security risk assessment, expert judgement has more weight than the background 
knowledge. 
Aven (2010)based on “Russian roulette game” and the following laws stressed that the 
expected value may be the successful prediction, if (1) several independent experiments within 
the similar range of value exist, (2) under the law of large number, (3) applying the central limit 
theorem. Here, the existing background knowledge about the projects plays the significant role 
Willis and Rand Corporation (2005) made an assessment of resource allocation based 
on the potential of a terrorist attack in different regions in the US. They used the expected values 
for the terrorist risk that is similar to an investment in various independent projects within               
a similar range of value. Conversely, to assess the potential for individuals it is not reasonable 
to use the expected values. 
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Shortly, for the repeated experiments like gambling and availability of a system the 
expected value can lead to a good result. Conversely, the decision regarding any possible 
counterterrorism effort cannot be made according to the expected value or any distribution of 
attack because of the extreme national and international consequences (Aven, 2010).  
4.2 To How Extent Considered Norwegian Standard Is Fruitful? 
Standard defines pure risk as potential for loss and not for profit, see §3.3.7. The pure 
risk defines in the literature as an insurable risk that has a known probability of loss,                       
ref (Moles and Terry, 1996). Additionally, the Standard defines risk as not the potential for 
profit that does not make sense when assessing the security risk. The authors mentioned above 
defines the known probability of loss which, tacitly, means to apply either classical or the 
frequentist probability, see §2.1.1.  
The classical interpretation of probability cannot apply for scientific reasons because, 
in the real life, the outcomes for the events are not equally likely to occur, and some of them 
promote by others. Hence, the application of this interpretation is limited to stochastic 
experiments such as gambling and sampling. On the other hand, Frequentist probability does 
not refer to outcomes that are equally likely to occur, but it reflects the repeating experiments 
in a long run. For practical reasons, repeating the experiments is impossible, for example, we 
hope that September 11th not to occur again.  The disasters are unique with many barriers each 
of which has a different probability of failure and thus, it is not possible to repeat the disasters. 
Practical situations cannot be repeated for many times then to understand the probability of 
occurrence for a complex system it is necessary to adapt a subjective probability that refers to 
the background knowledge. Subjective probability implements when considering the 
background knowledge and uncertainty. In fact, in objective probability events are uncertain 
while subjective probability considers the uncertainty both in future events and applied 
background knowledge. For risk assessment purposes, it is more meaningful to use the Lindley's 
interpretation of subjective probability which refers to Urn standard, ref (Aven et al., 2014).  
Aven (2012) collected all risk definitions in nine categories which the first one involves 
the potential for loss. This definition has a connection to probability and expected value.            
The probability is the measure of uncertainty but not as exactly as it is and, therefore, the only 
way is to apply the subjective probability as mentioned before. The expected value is the centre 
of gravity of the assigned distribution that involves many assumptions and limitation. Hence, 
the risk should not be limited to expected values and probabilistic modelling. 
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It seems unconventional approach to security risk when standard pays its attention to 
positive points such as increasing profit and marked share. In the area of security risk 
assessment how analysts can convince the decision-maker to have such a fortune? How               
the threats or, in general, an attack can affect the economy in the positive way? Although the 
Standards have the integrated view on the defined problems counting the fortunes is not                  
a suitable framework for the security risk assessment. Indeed, analysts should take the negative 
points into consideration such as loss of life and damage to the infrastructures and so on. 
Standard stressed that analysis should use the new way of thinking so-called “critical 
thinking” and it is about the new way of data collection. The Standard do not close the process 
with introducing a particular model for analysing the data. Hence, It will be beneficial if 
analysts apply the knowledge assessment and surprise assessment alongside the probability 
analysis Aven (2013a). Another good point to pay attention in this regard is Deference to 
expertise that is about answering all questions in the new situations with relevant experts. This 
pillar is about getting help from experts in risk management team(Aven and Krohn, 2014).  
Standard defines risk as a threat, vulnerability, and values. On the other hand, Willis 
and other researchers define risk as a threat, vulnerability, and consequences. As mentioned 
before, defining these elements is not an easy task, and it is not meaningful to represent these 
factors as a single number. Willis believes in uncertainty in assigning the numbers, but he did 
not use any systematic approach for treating the uncertainty. 
Fortunately, the Norwegian standard does not mention to allocate the factors with the 
probability numbers. The Standard suggested the qualitative assessment. It means to assess the 
risk both in qualitative and quantitative ways. Although the procedure put more emphasis            
on the connection between decision-maker and analyst group determining the appropriate 
values for the risk assessment is a difficult step.  
Having considered values, it is also necessary to look at the associated consequences for 
each scenario. On the other hand, consequences are the possible failure for the defined values. 
Hence, it is conventional to replace the values in the risk picture with the consequences. This 
view gives more details about the failures and losses.  
Besides, the Standard considers factors in a qualitative way, and Willis picture assigns 
a probability number for the risk. Accordingly, we can combine the two approach with a slight 
change in the definition. Thus, risk defines as a threat, vulnerability, consequences, and the 
probability of occurrence. Here, the remaining issue is the uncertainty associated with the 
background knowledge and future undesirable events.  
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Some experts believe the probability-based risk assessment (PRA) has poor risk picture 
and unable to predict surprises, e.g. (Aven et al., 2014; Bedford and Cooke, 2001). Probabilistic 
risk analysis involves uncertainty and model(s) cannot reveal all aspects of the risk. An equally 
significant aspect of the assessment is to rate the background knowledge. Thus, alongside the 
probabilistic assessment it is crucial to rate the background knowledge(Aven, 2013b) and to 
make the top-ten list of all undesirable events(Abrahamsen et al., 2010). 
In uncertainty-based risk, assessment alongside with the PRA risk picture involves 
uncertainty and assessing background knowledge. Hence, safety risk defines as;                               
(A, C, C*, U, P, K). In the description, C is the associated consequences and C* is a prediction 
of the real possible outcomes. U is uncertainty about the initial event and consequences. P is 
the probability of occurrence and K is the background knowledge, ref (Abrahamsen et al., 
2010). Hence, it is possible to apply a similar description for the security risk assessment.  
The probability is the measure of uncertainty, and the uncertainty assessment involves 
the background evaluation. Therefore, the security risk assessment may describe as a threat, 
vulnerability, consequences, and uncertainty. In more simple form-like what mentioned by 
Abrahamsen et al.(2010)for safety risk analysis- the consequences comes from threat and 
depends on the vulnerability of the target. Hence, the risk has two main sides, consequences 
and uncertainty.  
One of the considered strategies to treat the risk is to transfer it to other. It has not a 
clear definition about how to apply this strategy in practice. Transferring the risk has no 
connection to scientific literature about treating or reducing the risk. This part need to review 
and consider the better choices of strategies. 
4.3 Discussion on the Integrated Framework for Decision-Making  
The risk analysis may end up with causes, consequences and different tools to evaluate 
the risk. Alongside, analyst team evaluate the security measures in case the result of the analysis 
shows the severe consequences, see§2.3 and §3.3.10. The result is meaningful when comparing 
to the criteria and thus, the first point is the responsible party to define the criteria. The criteria 
define by either authority or private sections. 
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- Who is responsible for defining the criteria? 
For the security assessment, the Standard (§3.4.2) emphasise that the decision-maker 
should define and verify the criteria for the evaluation. In the Security section, analyst team has 
the close connection with the authority. 
In Norwegian petroleum sector, the licensees have the full responsibility for establishing 
and doing all activities, according to the rules. The authority has, thus, the supervisory role to 
ensure that working environment and safety criteria meet the regulation. It means the operator 
defines the acceptable level of safety in the petroleum sector in Norway. This regulation 
challenged by Abrahamsen and Aven (2012). The discussion provided using the expected utility 
theory, see §2.3.2. Assume, the operator defines the criteria and thus, invests money to reduce 
the risk of loss. The money invested in the self-protected area decrease the possessions of the 
operator and if the accident happens the extra money losses. The optimal situation is the point 
where the utility benefit equals the utility of decreasing the wealth. The utility benefit refers to 
as declining the probability of loss and increasing fortune for reducing losses.  
The analysis by these authors shows that if the level defines the likelihood of being in    
a bad state, the operator should invest more money to satisfy the optimal investment point.        
The investment should be higher when protecting the society because the activity has an 
external effect on the society and it costs more money. When modelling this extra money, the 
investment should be even more, and it is not the preferred choice for the operators.                      
The operator can define the higher utility level to spend less money on the self-protection. 
Accordingly, the authority should define the risk criteria as a part of the risk management 
program, ref (Abrahamsen and Aven, 2012). 
- Decision-making with outcomes of different types 
The second point in decision-making raises when there exist different alternatives and 
different tools to evaluate them in case of risk-reducing measures. The investment has no direct 
relation to the level of safety. It means, for example, investing double money does not make the 
project safe or secure as twice. Hence, it is the responsibility of the decision-maker to choose 
the best alternative that balance the level of safety with the investment. The acceptable level of 
risk and the amount of money to invest in the project are not mutually exclusive items. These 
two problems, of course, has one answer because both has a link to the value. Hence, the 
standard procedure is necessary to use these tools in the black box.  
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What are the characteristics of an excellent framework for decision-making? They are 
many regulations by authorities in the whole world. The issue is to find if a regulation is 
effective or not? Five principles are defined to examine the frameworks about their efficiency. 
Accordingly, the regulation is right when meets five principles. The principles also work when 
considering frameworks for decision-making. It is to ensure that the best framework for 
comparing outcomes is chosen according to the known and accepted principle of sound 
decision-making. Thus, the Better Regulation Task Force (BRTF) defined the five principles of 
good regulation as proportionality; accountability; consistency; transparency; and necessity,    
ref (Boyfield, 2006). These five principles present shortly in the following: 
- Proportionality: Just in case of necessary situation authority shall defines                         
the regulation, and the solution should be appropriate to the risk, cost should be reduced. 
This principle is to make sure the regulations are suited to deal with the situation. 
- Accountability: Regulators shall be published in public, and they should have clear 
criteria for the judgement. They are accessible, fair and have an appeal process. 
- Consistency: The rules should be linked together and be compatible with each other. 
They should take other rules into account. Regulation should be predictable.                    
The consistent framework means to adopt a similar approach for similar situations. 
- Transparency: The regulation should be open, simple and communicate to all involved 
parties.  
- Targeting: The regulations should be focused on the considered issue and minimise the 
side effect. 
Thus, a sound framework for decision-making should involve these five principles. The 
transparency and consistency are more important in the case of evaluating the decision-making 
procedure. Abrahamsen et al. (2011) examined some frameworks of decision making such as 
cost-benefit analysis and multi-attribute analysis. These authors concluded that a framework is 
neither transparent nor consistent if all attributes of different types do not transform to the one 
comparable unit that might be country’s monetary value. The paper presents in the following, 
shortly, ref (Abrahamsen et al., 2011). 
The procedure is applying the framework to compare all alternatives of different types 
to choose the suitable one for decision-making. In a cost-benefit analysis (§2.3.3), all outcomes 
transform to money, for example, the value of the statistical life or the damage to the 
environment. The weakness points of CBA mentioned before, in particular, transforming 
outcomes to money might be controversial. Thus, pragmatic view on CBA applies which does 
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not necessarily transform all attributes into money but a comparable unit. This assessment can 
be reviewed and judged again by others at any time. The decision is open to assess again and 
has rational links to the elements. The pragmatic approach to cost-benefit analysis is consistent 
and transparent when comparing outcomes of different types. 
However, in multi-attribute analysis outcomes of different types do not transform to one 
value and decision-maker subjectively weights the money and safety. This analysis is not open 
to assess again because evaluating procedure is different from one person to another. Besides, 
there is no link to other elements in this framework and due to disutility between elements some 
situation promotes to some other situation. 
Finally, Abrahamsen et al. (2011) assessed the cost-effectiveness analysis. In this 
procedure, the expected cost for non-commercial outcomes calculates by multiplication of 
decision-makers valuation of the outcome to the amount of that material. For example, the 
decision-makers valuation of hydrocarbon released to the see in tonnes multiplies by the 
released amount of hydrocarbon in a ton. In this procedure, the decision makers valuation is the 
subjective procedure and in situations with the various non-commercial materials the decision 
is neither consistent nor transparent. The analysis is sensitive to the valuation of different 
attributes.  
- Cautionary Principle and ALARP 
Standard (§3.3.10) suggests to apply measure in connection to profit and cost and, 
therefore, the cost-benefit analysis, or other economic analysis may apply. There is a discussion 
about applying ALARP and take the cautionary principle into consideration. Aven and 
Abrahamsen (2007) made a calculation and compared CBA and cautionary principle on the 
safety basis. The procedure is to assign a value of statistical life and apply the cost-benefit 
analysis for both situations of implementing and not implementing the reducing measure. The 
key point of the analysis is to assign the value of statistical life and to calculate the frequency 
of the failure. The cost-benefit analysis does not have the clear message for decision-making 
because the mathematical model may show the gross disproportionate due to some assumption 
and limitation. However, with small changes in the basic assumptions the result might be 
entirely different and accept to implement the measure.  
In case of a threat in the public sector, the assumptions are rather sensitive to change 
and, therefore, the result of CBA shall take the sensitivity and uncertainty into account. Aven 
and Abrahamsen (2007) stressed that portfolio theory and corporate risk point of view proved 
the reasonability of using VSL but being caution means to use greater values for the statistical 
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life. Additionally, using discount rate and using certainty equivalent for cash flow does not 
consider uncertainty as it should be and hence, the analysis shall consider uncertainty outside 
of the CBA framework. 
The nature of the security is different from the safety, ref §2.2.2. Thus, applying ALARP 
in security assessment needs take into account the adaptive nature of attack, quantitative 
conditional cost-benefit analysis and any possible limitation for personal liberties. The ALARP 
procedure (ref §2.3.6) is, therefore, shall be revised to meet these three key points as following, 
ref (Guikema and Aven, 2010).  
1. The first step is to assess the benefit, and effect of the risk reducing measure, 
qualitatively. Since the attack can be adapt with the risk management program the 
potential risk to others is also important to evaluate. The procedure may consist of 
the loss of personal liberties due to applying the measure. If the cost of doing the 
measure is not high and the risk is not significant, then the measure applies, and the 
gross disproportion is not the point. 
2. In case of large cost in the first step, analysts can perform cost-benefit analysis 
quantitatively. The [ ]attackNPVE | and attackICAF | shall be calculated which 
both of them are conditional based on occurring attack. If the expectation for net 
present value is high or ICAF is small, also the probability of attack is not negligible 
then gross disproportion does not prove and measure should be taken. 
3. If the circumstances in step two do not meet the criteria the next step is to perform 
an uncertainty assessment. The analysis prepares checklist of all possible uncertain 
elements and potential risk that have not included before, and if the checklist has 
high score then the measure shall be taken. 
4. This step involves political consideration, and the decision-maker shall judge 
whether the risk reducing measure is gross disproportion to the benefit. 
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5 Conclusion 
Two different perspectives apply for risk assessment worldwide in either industries or 
security sectors. The thesis presented PRA and uncertainty-based perspective to risk 
assessment. PRA, of course, involves background knowledge and expert’s opinion but has no 
systematic procedure to evaluate them in the process and, therefore, this approach has a poor 
risk picture regarding uncertainty and data assessment. On the other hand, the terrorist attack is 
an adaptive plan against targets such as people, economy and infrastructure. Hence, dealing 
with this issue needs more complex and dynamic approach to risk assessment. Thus, 
uncertainty-based assessment is an alternative way to reveal all possible future events, 
particularly, in the security sector.  
The next issue was to compare the existing scholarly literature within the area of risk 
assessment with the standard procedure for security risk assessment in Norway to find the 
possible weakness points. The thesis discussed the most significant weakness points of the 
Standard and concluded that the four top points need reviewing and changing. The weakness 
points are risk definition, risk picture, strategies, and the reducing measures. The risk definition 
consists of exact and known probability of a threat, and this implies to frequentist probability 
and the expected value that have challenged by many researchers, ref §4.2. Risk picture 
excludes uncertainty and the background knowledge as the main contributors of the risk picture. 
This weakness point avoids the decision-maker to have a clear overview of the future events 
and give incomplete information for further investigation. When considering the strategy to 
deal with the different level of risk, one of those four alternatives is to transfer risk to other, 
which has no justification according to existing literature. The last but not the least point is to 
apply the measure in connection with cost. The Standard suggests accepting the risk in case the 
condition, benefits gain, or cost of implementing measure(s) dictate. Here, the cautionary 
principle should apply and, at the same time, ALARP helps to find the balance situation, see 
§4.3.  
When risk analysis evaluates different alternative for reducing the risk, the outcomes 
may have various types. Standard suggests to find the threat from various contributors include 
technical, organizational, and human resources. The various contributors have different values, 
for example,   the value of statistical life, damage to the infrastructure, and damage to the 
environment have their values. Here, different frameworks exist to compare all alternatives, 
and each has various applications. Abrahamsen et al. (2011) argued the applied framework 
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should be consistent and transparent and conclude that the only way to have a procedure with 
these two principle is to transform all attributes into the comparable value and suggested 
pragmatic view on cost-benefit analsis. Moreover, they stressed that these frameworks are tools 
to help the decision-maker having the most useful and reliable decision and, therefore, the tools 
should take carefully to avoid the mechanical and decision-making process. Additionally, 
ALARP analysis should be a part of decision-making to balance the situation. 
The thesis limited its attention to security risk Standard in Norway (NS 5831, 2014, NS 
5832, 2014), but there exist other Standards which contribute to the security risk assessment.         
It is necessary to review all existing standard frameworks to find and correct possible weakness 
points. In §4.3 five principles of good decision-making presented but according to Abrahamsen 
et al. (2011) just transparency and consistency examined for the decision-making framework. 
The procedure can be reviewed for other principles to have the most suitable framework for 
decision-making. 
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